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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LC ("Vincent") agrees with the statement
of jurisdiction contained in the Brief of Appellants Delta Canal Company; Melville
Irrigation Company; Abraham Irrigation Company; Deseret Irrigation Company; and
Central Utah Water Company (collectively, "DMADC").
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
DMADC presents numerous issues for review on appeal. Vincent disagrees with
some unfounded assumptions made in DMADC s statement of the issues presented for
review, and will address those assumptions herein. However, Vincent generally agrees
with the standard of review set forth by DMADC and agrees that the issues were
preserved below.
STATUTES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
The 2002 and 2007 versions of Utah Code Annotated section 73-1-4 are of central
importance to this appeal. Copies of these authorities are included in the Addendum to
this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

This case involves the interpretation of the partial forfeiture language first made a
part of Utah Code Annotated section 73-1-4 in 2002. DMADC filed this lawsuit seeking
an order of partial forfeiture relating to a portion of Vincent's water right. DMADC
claimed that Vincent had failed to put its full water right to beneficial use for a

1

continuous period of five years and that the unused portion was forfeited in favor of
downstream users, including DMADC.
DMADC misapprehends both the law of forfeiture and the way Vincent has
managed the water represented by its water right. That right is not subject to forfeiture
for non-use during the period since enactment of the 2002 statute, nor was it under
common law prior to the legislature's enactment of the statute. Section 73-1-4, and the
common law prior to that, expressly exempt a water right from forfeiture where the
source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy the right. DMADC freely acknowledges
that, in the event river flows are not sufficient to satisfy all water rights, available river
flows are "prorated in proportion to the respective amount each user . . . is entitled to
use." (DMADC Br. at xx (quotation marks omitted).) It was demonstrated below, as a
matter of law, that the Sevier River did not produce sufficient water to satisfy all water
rights in each of the last twenty years. Accordingly, Vincent's water right is exempt from
a claim of partial forfeiture during that period. Clearly, DMADC did not plead or prove
any basis for Vincent to have taken the full amount of water described in its right in a
time of drought, ahead of others of equal or superior priority.
What water Vincent does receive from the Sevier River is put to beneficial use.
Unlike DMADC, Vincent's water right contains no carry-over storage component and
Vincent has no meaningful ability to supplement its river right from wells or other
sources. Vincent must anticipate the summer's water supply when it plants in the spring
and hope that nature will provide sufficient to raise an economically viable crop. This is
necessarily an inexact science, but Vincent has been successful in making these
2

prognostications. Except on a few rare occasions when it began operations on this farm,
Vincent has been able to use all of the water available to it from the river and, when
additional water under its right has become available, Vincent has been able to
beneficially use that water on its more marginally productive fields and to enhance
habitat.1 Vincent's beneficial use of substantially all of the water available to it, and any
nonuse caused by the failure of the Sevier River to produce sufficient water, preclude
forfeiture of a portion of the water right.
II.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

DMADC initiated this action on May 1, 2008, by filing a Complaint with the
Fourth District Court in Millard County. (R. at 1-17.) DMADC alleged that Vincent
owned Water Right No. 68-3002, which right arose pursuant to a judicial decree entered
on November 30, 1936, in Case No. 843, Richlands Irrigation Co. v. West View
Irrigation Co. et al. (the "Cox Decree"). (R. at 3.) DMADC sought forfeiture or
abandonment of a portion of Vincent's water right, claiming Vincent failed to put the
entire right to beneficial use. (R. at 4-7.)
Vincent moved for summary judgment on DMADC s claims because the
undisputed facts established that Vincent had consistently used all of the water that was
available to it from the Sevier River. (R. at 104-105, 110-113.) Vincent at times had
l DMADC, both in its brief on appeal and in its arguments below, confuses irrigation
with cultivation, using the terms interchangeably as if they had the same meaning and
import. They do not, at least in this case. While Vincent may have regularly cultivated
some 900 acres of land based on the flows it could reasonably anticipate from the Sevier
River, it has regularly used additional water when available to irrigate additional, noncultivated land up to its 1,051.5 acre right to improve habitat for cattle grazing and its
commercial bird operation.
3

failed to irrigate the full acreage specified under Water Right No. 68-3002, but only
because the Sevier River failed to provide enough water to satisfy Vincent's right. (R. at
110-113.) DMADC's claims failed as a matter of law because Vincent's nonuse was due
to the natural unavailability in the source of the full amount of its water right. (R. at 11418.)
DMADC filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, also claiming that no
material fact was undisputed. (R. at 229.) DMADC argued that Vincent could not have
used the full water right, which entitled Vincent to irrigate 1,051.5 acres, because Vincent
had cultivated only 837 acres of farmland. (R. at 245.) DMADC based its arguments in
part on its contention that the irrigation duty applicable to Vincent's property was four
acre feet per acre. (R. at 248.) DMADC asked the district court to take judicial notice of
the Utah Division of Water Rights website that listed a duty of four acre feet per acre.
(R. at 248.) DMADC also focused on Vincent's predecessor-in-interest, arguing that it
similarly failed to use, and forfeited, a portion of the water right during the period before
the statute provided for partial forfeiture. (R. at 248-50.) Finally, DMADC claimed that
Vincent's use of irrigation water to support its commercial bird hunting operation and for
cattle grazing, rather than on cultivated fields, was not a beneficial use. (R. at 243-44.)
The evidence submitted by DMADC confirmed, however, that Vincent and its
predecessor in interest had used substantially all of the water available during the relevant
time period. (R. at 351-61.) DMADC's evidence confirmed that there were no disputed
issues of material fact regarding the amount of water available to Vincent and its
predecessor. (R. at 357-58.) In fact, the river provided 100% of the amount of water
4

decreed for its users three times in the 30 years prior to the hearing. (R. at 206.) Further,
Utah law did not provide for partial forfeiture of a water right until 2002. (R. at 358-60.)
Vincent also argued that the beneficial use of water is not limited to application of the
water on cultivated land. (R. at 360.) Vincent beneficially used the water to irrigate the
vegetation necessary to operate its commercial bird hunting operation and for winter
cattle grazing. (R. at 360.) Vincent also demonstrated that the Proposed Determination ,
confirmed by the Cox Decree, allocated 5,000 acre feet of water to irrigate Vincent's
1,051.5 acres of land. That Decree which has not been altered or amended in this respect,
adjudicated the amount (or duty) of water Vincent is entitled to use on its farm. (R. at
356-57. See also R. at 125.)
On December 9, 2010, DMADC filed a Request to Submit for Decision and
Request for Hearing, certifying pursuant to Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure that briefing was complete and inviting the district court to rule on the
summary judgment motions. (R. at 395-96.) The district court held a hearing on
March 30, 2011, at which the parties presented oral argument. (R. at 400, 763.) On
May 26, 2011, and before the district court had ruled on the summary judgment motions,
DMADC filed a Motion for Leave to Supplement Summary Judgment Record,
attempting to offer an alternative argument based on information already before the
district court. (R. at 401.)
The district court issued a Memorandum Decision on Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment on June 6, 2011, granting in part and denying in part Vincent's motion and
denying DMADC s motion. (R. at 414-421.) The district court held there was no dispute
5

that the Sevier River failed periodically to yield sufficient water to satisfy Vincent's
water right. (R. at 417.) The court based its holding on the undisputed river flow records
submitted by both parties establishing that Vincent used all water available to it in 2002
and 2007. (R. at 417-18.) "Due to [Vincent's] use of all available water in 2002 and in
2007, when considering all possible five year blocks between 1999 and 2009, there is no
five year period in which [Vincent] has not used all available water at least one year out
of each five year period." (R. at 418.) The district court concluded that although Vincent
"was entitled to receive a full duty water right of 4,206 acre feet," Vincent "can not lose
by forfeiture water which it did not receive due to physical conditions outside of its
control including over-subscription of the water supply." (R. at 417.)
The district court denied DMADC's motion on the same grounds. (R. at 420-21.)
Even if DMADC were correct that Vincent had not cultivated enough land to receive the
full amount of its water right, there was no dispute that Vincent had not received
sufficient water, for reasons outside of Vincent's control, to irrigate 1,051.5 acres. (R. at
420.) The district court's decision was based in part on DMADC's own "calculations of
land cultivated and irrigated, and the amount of water needed to water that land." (R. at
420.) The court also considered and rejected DMADC's "flawed" supplemental
argument because it assumed Vincent could receive its full water right "without regard to
the limitations placed on its water rights by virtue of the over subscription of the water
supply." (R. at 417.) It was undisputed that Vincent put the majority of its water to
beneficial use on its cultivated land. (R. at 419.) The district court determined that there
was a factual dispute, however, regarding the amount of water Vincent used to irrigate
6

the wildlife habitat used for its commercial hunting operation and cattle grazing and
whether such use was beneficial. (R. at 419.)
On July 20, 2011, DM ADC moved the district court to reconsider its summary
judgment ruling. (R. at 438-439.) DMADC did not present new evidence or new legal
grounds for its argument. Rather, DMADC suggested that the district court must not
have fully considered certain facts and attempted to reargue facts and issues previously
presented to the district court. (See R. at 442.) For example, DMADC argued that
Vincent had adopted conflicting positions regarding its irrigation and that the district
court failed to consider water available to Vincent during the pre-irrigation season. (R. at
446-451.) But, Vincent consistently claimed to irrigate up to 1,051.5 acres of land as
water is available from the Sevier River. (R. at 574.) Additionally, while Vincent is
allowed to take water if it can be put to beneficial use in the pre-irrigation season, it is not
obligated to take it and run it to waste just to satisfy DMADC's calculations. In most
years, Vincent was unable to receive or use the pre-irrigation water and Vincent had no
storage right for the pre-irrigation water. (R. at 575-77.) DMADC's new arguments did
not alter the fact that the Sevier River is over-appropriated and generally has not
delivered enough water to satisfy Vincent's water right. (R. at 577.)
On December 7, 2011, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision on
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Partial Summary Judgment, refusing to disturb
its original ruling. (R. at 683-87.) The district court observed that it had erred in relying
upon DMADC's representation that the duty of Vincent's water right was 4,206 acre feet,
and should have instead relied on the Cox Decree and the Proposed Determination, which
7

confirmed 5,000 acre feet as the measure of Water Right No. 68-3002. (R. at 685-86.)
The district court further held that, although DMADC was essentially rearguing facts and
issues already before the court, even considering those arguments the original ruling was
not affected because DMADC still failed to establish that the source yielded sufficient
water over time to satisfy Vincent's right. (R. at 686-87.)
Vincent prepared a proposed order on the district court's ruling denying
DMADCs Motion for Reconsideration. (See R. at 687.) DMADC objected to the
proposed order and requested once again that the court revisit its prior rulings. (R. at
689-96.) DMADC claimed that the district court failed to address the issue of water use
by Vincent's predecessor and erred in relying on the Proposed Determination. (R. at 69193.) Once more, DMADC took issue with the district court's forfeiture analysis and
claimed its abandonment claim remained pending for trial. (R. at 694-96.)
The district court heard oral argument on DMADC's Objections to Proposed
Order and/or Request for Clarification of Orders on March 28, 2012. (R. at 734, 765.)
On April 2, 2012, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision on DMADC s
objections and request for clarification. (R. at 735-39.) Therein, the court patiently
reiterated and confirmed its prior rulings. The court held that the relevant time period for
DMADC's claims was 1988 through 2008 and that the statute on which DMADC relied
was amended in 2002. (R. at 736.) The court confirmed that the amendment was
substantive and could not be applied retroactively. (R. at 736. See also R. at 416.) Thus,
the court relied on the common law for the period between 1988 and 2002, and on the
statute for the period between 2002 and 2008. (R. at 736.)
8

Based on the undisputed evidence, the court held that the Sevier River failed to
yield sufficient water to satisfy Vincent's right in any year between 2002 and 2008, and
Vincent was exempt from the statute as a matter of law. (R. at 737.) The court stated
that "[b]oth forfeiture and abandonment were brought [by DMADC] pursuant to Section
73-1-4 of the Utah Code. Therefore, after the statutory exemption was in place,
[DMADC is] precluded from claiming either a partial forfeiture, or partial abandonment."
(R. at 737.) The district court also restated its ruling regarding partial forfeiture or
abandonment prior to 2002 and held that DMADC, as a matter of law, had "failed to
provide a legal basis to establish that partial forfeiture or abandonment is an available
remedy under the statutes of the state prior to 2002, or that it has been recognized as a
common law cause of action." (R. at 737-38.)
The district court next clarified that its summary judgment analysis had addressed
the use of Water Right No. 68-3002 between the relevant time period of 1988 through
2008, regardless of who owned the right. (R. at 738.) Clearly, the court's prior statement
that the Sevier River failed to "yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right for
defendant and its predecessor" (see R. at 417) included the period in which Vincent's
predecessor owned the water right and used water. (R. at 738.) The district court also
rejected DMADC s claim that Vincent improperly relied on the Proposed Determination
to the Cox Decree where: DMADC failed to raise a timely objection; DMADC failed to
present any reliable evidence itself; and where DMADC itself relied upon the Proposed
Determination as a basis for determining the attributes of the water right. (R. at 739.)
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The parties agreed that no issues remained to be tried and that final judgment
should enter. (R. at 753.) The district court entered a Final Order and Judgment on
May 7, 2012, (R. at 752-57), and this appeal followed.
III.

Statement of Facts

1.

The Cox Decree, adjudicating the rights to the waters of the Sevier River,

was issued on November 30, 1936, in Richlands Irrigation Co. v. West View Irrigation
Co. et aU Case No. 843. (R. at 3, 165-67, 254-63.)
2.

Pursuant to the Cox Decree, the Samuel Mclntyre Investment Company

("Mclntyre") was awarded Water Right No. 68-3002. (R. at 168-70, 258-61.)
3.

In 1998, Vincent purchased the Mclntyre ranch and its water rights,

including Water Right No. 68-3002. (R. at 136-37, 142.)
4.

Water Right No. 68-3002 allows for the diversion of 22.0 cfs of water from

the Sevier River. (R. at 3, 12-14. See also R. at 168-70, 258, 260.)
5.

The Cox Decree was based in part on the Proposed Determination

previously prepared by the Utah State Engineer, the so-called "Bacon's Bible." (R. at
166,255.)
6.

The Proposed Determination allows for the irrigation of 1,051.5 acres of

land with 5,000 acre feet of water. (R. at 3, 16, 168-70, 685-87. See also R. at 155-56,
420,673-75.)
7.

There was no timely objection to Water Right No. 68-3002 as set forth in

the Proposed Determination and that relevant portion of the Proposed Determination was
confirmed and adopted in the Cox Decree. (See R. at 166-70, 255-60.)
10

8.

The Cox Decree was a final judicial decree from which no appeal was

taken. (R. at 420-21.) No party to this action contended that the Cox Decree has been
altered or amended since it was entered by the District Court in 1936.
9.

While the Cox Decree allocates the right to use water to irrigate 1,051.5

acres to Water Right No. 68-3002, it does not guarantee that sufficient water will be
made available to the user. The river is over-appropriated. (See R. at 168-70, 258-61,
417.)
10.

The amount of water allocated to each user on the Sevier River is carefully

controlled and determined by the Sevier River Commissioner using a complex
accounting system to determine what percentage of their water rights the river users will
be allowed to divert each year. (R. at 146, 157, 417, 589, 684.)
11.

The Sevier River usually does not produce sufficient water to fulfill 100%

of the primary water rights, and diversions to the water users are routinely reduced
commensurate with the reduced river flows. (R. at 146, 157, 366, 417, 589, 684. See
also R. at 195-206, 369-82, 527-51.)
12.

Records of the Sevier River Commissioner, on which both parties relied,

show that the Sevier River has produced sufficient water to supply all of Water Right No.
68-3002 in only three years since 1935. (R. at 206, 508. (See also R. at 195-206, 371-81,
528-60.)
13.

Although their water deliveries were reduced, Vincent and its predecessor

used substantially all of the water available to them between 1988 and 2008 (the twentyyear period prior to the filing of DMADC's Complaint). Between 1987 and 1998,
11

Mclntyre "used all of the water [it] could on the approximately 830 cultivated acres" and
"never had too much water or more water than [it] could use on the 830 cultivated acres."
(R. at 344. See also R. at 366, 417, 738, 743-44.)
14.

With the minor exception of the first years of operation as it learned the

Sevier River allocation and accounting system, Vincent has likewise placed all of the
water allocated to Water Right 68-3002 by the Sevier River Commissioner to beneficial
use each year that Vincent has owned the property. (R. at 129 (lines 1-4), 139-40, 14649, 157, 159, 191, 226, 418, 686-87, 743-44.)
15.

During the pre-irrigation season (March 1 through April 15), Vincent has a

right to divert a direct flow of the Sevier River, but the pre-April 15 flows do not include
any storage component. If unused, the pre-April 15 flows cannot be claimed as storage
credits for use later in the irrigation seasons. (R. at 123, 582-83, 588.)
16.

Very few water users can put water to beneficial use during the pre-

irrigation season for a number of reasons. There is generally little water available in the
Sevier River during that time period. Additionally, the ground is often covered by snow
or remains too wet from winter precipitation to clear ditches and prepare fields. The wet
fields also cannot accept irrigation water and attempting such early irrigation can damage
crops. Only one water user on the lower Sevier River regularly diverts and uses water
during the pre-irrigation season. (R. at 583-84, 588.)
17.

Between April 16 and October 1 of each year, Vincent may elect not to

divert the full amount of water available to it and store a portion for use later in the
irrigation season when primary flows of the Sevier River are low. The credits Vincent
12

may accrue in storage are determined by Vincent's prorated right to divert water based
upon the flow of the river. (R. at 123, 588, 590. See also, e.g., R. at 195-205.)
18.

Vincent's storage credits do not carry over year to year and Vincent has no

supplemental well or other water rights it can use to irrigate. Vincent receives only the
water provided in the Sevier River by nature each year. (See R. at 137-40, 168-70, 25861,588,590.)
19.

Because the Sevier River usually does not provide 100% of the flows

allocated by the Cox Decree and Vincent's diversions are cut back, Vincent must assess
the potential water deliveries it will receive in any given year and allocate the water to its
most profitable and actively irrigated lands. (R. at 138-40, 148, 157-59.)
20.

Vincent can safely assume that it will be able to irrigate approximately 900

acres each year to a full irrigation duty and produce a mature and economically viable
crop with the water that is likely to be available to it throughout the irrigation season.
(R. at 137-38, 585.)
21.

Vincent uses additional water, when made available by the River

Commissioner, to irrigate its more marginally productive fields, typically at less than a
full irrigation duty. (R. at 138, 147-48, 158-59.)
22.

Any remaining water, including the run-off from the irrigated fields, is

diverted to irrigate other areas of the ranch used for winter cattle pasture and in the
state-licensed commercial bird operation run by Vincent. (R. at 138-39, 147-48, 158-59,
360-61.)
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23.

Vincent has the land and the ability to devote acreage to cultivation up to its

allowed 1,051.5 acres if it knew in advance of each year that the Sevier River would
produce 100% of its flow. But since this has not been the case, Vincent prudently
allocates the full amount of water made available by the Sevier River Commissioner first
to its most profitable lands, and then for irrigation of more marginal lands including its
bird habitat areas. (R. at 139, 148, 159.)
24.

In August 2006, Vincent filed a change application with the Utah State

Engineer to more efficiently use the water made available from the river. Vincent sought
to change the place of use for some of its water from steep and less productive ground to
an area with better soils where an efficient pivot irrigation system would be installed.
(R. at 219-221.)
25.

DMADC protested the application. {See R. at 225-28.)

26.

The State Engineer approved Vincent's change application, specifically

noting, based upon available data (including protestants' maps and aerial photos), that "it
appears that [Vincent] has consistently diverted the water available under this water right
and irrigated nearly all of the acreage." (R. at 226.)
27.

DMADC appealed the State Engineer's approval of the Vincent change

application and also filed this action, seeking an order declaring a partial forfeiture of
Vincent's water right.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court properly granted Vincent summary judgment on DMADC s
claims because the failure of the Sevier River to deliver full flows made Vincent's water
14

right statutorily exempt from forfeiture. DMADC had sought forfeiture of a portion of
Vincent's water right, alleging that Vincent failed to place a portion of its water to
beneficial use for a period of five years. The Utah forfeiture statute, section 73-1-4,
however, does not apply to "those periods of time when a surface water source fails to
yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right." The undisputed evidence, including the
records submitted by DMADC, demonstrated that the Sevier River failed to yield
sufficient water to satisfy Vincent's water right during the relevant time period.
The district court found that, prior to the adoption of the partial forfeiture statute in
2002, Utah law did not provide for the partial forfeiture of a water right. DMADC and
the Utah State Engineer argue that partial forfeiture has always been a feature of Utah
water law but, in more than 100 years of water cases decided in the second driest state in
the nation, they could not cite a single case holding that a water right had been partially
forfeited or abandoned. Indeed, this Court recognized in 1991 that, while partial
forfeiture may be consistent with public policy, the issue was not addressed in the statutes
and had never been directly presented to the Court. As if in response to that invitation,
the legislature amended Utah Code Annotated section 73-1-4 in 2002 to provide for
partial forfeiture and abandonment for unused portions of water rights. DMADC did not
offer any evidence to suggest that the 2002 amendment, which the district court here
found to be substantive, was intended by the legislature to be remedial or otherwise
retroactive in effect.
Although the district court found that Utah law did not provide for partial
forfeiture prior to 2002, it nevertheless analyzed the undisputed evidence offered in
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support of the opposing motions for summary judgment. It found, each of the several
times DMADC asked the court to look at it, that the court had reviewed the Sevier River
data provided by the parties for the years after 1988, and that there was no partial
forfeiture or abandonment of the water right, either by Vincent or by its predecessor.
The failure of the Sevier River to provide the full amount of water specified in
Vincent's water right requires Vincent to irrigate less than all of its acreage to its full
duty. Vincent does not have carry-over storage associated with its water right or
supplemental well rights; it receives only that water supplied by nature each year.
Vincent has been prudent in its use of water that is available to grow crops to full
maturity, grow feed for its livestock and to support its commercial bird hunting operation.
DMADC's arguments were based on incorrect or immaterial data. The district court
correctly determined that Vincent's beneficial use of all of the water available to it
precluded DMADC s partial forfeiture and abandonment claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

VINCENT'S WATER RIGHT WAS EXEMPT FROM PARTIAL
FORFEITURE BECAUSE THE SEVIER RIVER HAS FAILED TO
PRODUCE SUFFICIENT WATER TO SATISFY THE RIGHT
DMADC argues that the district court erred by refusing its request for partial

forfeiture of Vincent's water right and applying the so-called "physical causes defense."
Although DMADC sought partial forfeiture of Water Right No. 68-3002 under section
73-1-4 of the Utah Code, (R. at 4-7), DMADC ignores the plain language of that statute.
It expressly provides, and the district court correctly held, that Vincent's water right is
exempt from partial forfeiture, because the undisputed facts demonstrate that at all
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relevant times the Sevier River failed to produce sufficient water to satisfy Vincent's
right. Indeed, DMADC admits that "it was undisputed that the river typically did not
match the Cox Decree amounts

" (DMADC Br. at 18.) That same evidence

confirms that Vincent has beneficially used substantially all of the water provided to it
under the water right and is, on that additional ground, exempt from forfeiture.
A.

Section 73-1-4 Expressly Exempts Vincent's Water Right from
Forfeiture.

In 2002, the Utah Legislature amended the Utah forfeiture statute to allow for the
partial forfeiture of a water right and recognized that a consistent, long-term failure to use
a portion of a water right may subject the user to forfeiture of that portion. See Utah
Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (2002). DMADC filed its Complaint under the 2007 version of
section 73-1-4, which provides that one who "abandons or ceases to use all or a portion
of a water right for a period of five years" forfeits the water right or the unused portion of
that water right. Utah Code Ann. § 73-l-4(3)(a) (2007).2 (See alsoR. at 1-8.) A judicial
action seeking forfeiture of a water right must be initiated "within 15 years from the end
of the latest period of nonuse of at least five years." Utah Code Ann. § 73-l-4(c)(i)
(2007). Thus, the relevant time-period in this case was the twenty-year period (five years
plus fifteen years) prior to the filing of DMADCs Complaint in 2008.

Subsection (3)(a) was amended in 2008 to extend the nonuse period to seven years. The
parties and district court proceeded under the pre-2008 version of the statute because the
relevant time period occurred and DMADC s Complaint was filed prior to the effective
date of the amendment (see R. at 1-8, 418). DMADC did not argue that the 2008
amendment applied retroactively.
17

Because water rights are a type of property right, see Randolph Land & Livestock
Co. v. United States, 271 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah 1954), stripping them from an owner
through forfeiture is a harsh remedy. As such, the Legislature determined that one
random year of nonuse would not work to forfeit an owner's right. Rather, nonuse must
occur over a much longer period of time—a five year cycle in this case.3 The Court
requires "strict adherence to the statutory sanctions requiring forfeiture for the nonuse of
a water right" and "that a departure from this principle of strict adherence is justified only
in a 'rare and highly equitable case.'" Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 776
(Utah 1991) (quoting Baugh v. Criddle, 431 P.2d 790, 791-92 (Utah 1967)).
Additionally, all appropriation states have adopted exemptions to forfeiture to
prevent the "unfairness in loss of a water right through nonuse where conditions beyond
the control of the owner of such right prevent use." See, e.g., Chavez v. Gutierrez, 213
P.2d 597, 600 (N.M. 1950). Section 73-1-4 expressly exempts a water user from
forfeiture where the water source does not provide sufficient water to satisfy the right:
"The provisions of this section shall not apply: (i) to those periods of time when a
surface water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right." Utah
Code Ann. § 73-l-4(3)(f)(i) (emphasis added).
In construing statutes similar to this, the courts have uniformly held that
forfeiture will not operate in those cases where the failure to use is the
result of physical causes beyond the control of the appropriator such as
floods which destroy his dams and ditches, draughts, etc., where the
appropriator is ready and willing to divert the water when it is naturally
available.
3 As noted, the nonuse period has since been extended to grant water right owners even
more protection.
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Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 111 (Utah 1943)
(citing Morris v. Bean, 146 F. 423 (D. Mont. 1906), aff'd, 159 F. 651 (1908) & 221 U.S.
485 (1911); Ramsay v. Gottsche, 69 P.2d 535 (Wyo. 1937); Horse Creek Conservation
Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 92 P.2d 572 (Wyo. 1939); N.M. Prods. Co. v. N.M. Power Co.,
11 P.2d 634 (N.M. 1937); In re Manse Spring and its Tributaries, 108 P.2d 311 (Nev.
1940); Hutchings, Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, at 396).
The records submitted to the district court by the parties, including those
submitted by DMADC, showed that the Sevier River has consistently failed to yield
sufficient water to satisfy all decreed water rights.4 As DMADC acknowledges, in that
situation, the available flows are prorated in proportion to the rights. (DMADC Br. at
xx.) In considering the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
first examined water deliveries to Vincent during the possible five year periods between
2002 (the amendment of section 73-1-4 creating partial forfeiture) and 2008 (the filing

4 Both parties relied on data supplied by the Sevier River Commissioner, summarized at
R. 206, a copy of which is attached as Addendum C. The Court should note that the 22
cfs flow rate for Vincent's right to divert from the Sevier River may be measured at the
point of diversion, but its 5,000 acre foot right of use is measured at the place of use, the
Vincent farm. This is significant because Vincent's point of diversion is seven miles upcanal from its place of use. {See R. at 182-83.) DMADC's calculations simply based on
diversion rates are all undermined by its failure to address the significant conveyance loss
as water travels through a seven mile open, dirt-lined canal. Those losses may be as
much as 30%. DMADC's duty argument (duty is traditionally measured at the place of
use, rather than the point of diversion) is also undercut by its failure to account for
transmission losses.
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of DMADC's Complaint). (R. at 417-18.)5 The records showed that the Sevier River did
not produce sufficient water between 2002 and 2008 to fulfill all water rights, including
that belonging to Vincent. (R. at 206, 417-18, 508. See also R. at 146, 157, 198-204,
554-560.) The reduced river flows prevented Vincent from irrigating the full 1,051.5
acres allowed for in the Cox Decree. Yet, except for a few rare occasions, Vincent
beneficially used all of the water available to it by the river and the river commissioner.
That use is sufficient under our statutes. Farming, especially in a desert environment, is a
risky and unpredictable venture. It is perhaps in recognition of that fact that the
legislature does not require a precise accounting, but rather protects water rights from
forfeiture if "substantially all" of the right is put to beneficial use. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-l-4(2)(e)(vi) (2012).
The reduced amounts of water available for diversion from the Sevier River
require that Vincent anticipate and plan its water use each year to make the most
reasonable use of the amount of water that is scheduled to be delivered, and then to
beneficially use any additional water it may receive on its more marginal lands. Each
year, Vincent assess the amount of its water right it is likely to receive from the Sevier
River, and then plan accordingly to maximize the beneficial and economical use of that

5 The parties submitted evidence of and the district court, in fact, examined earlier water
deliveries to Vincent and its predecessor. (R. at 417, 738.) As discussed in more detail
below, the district court held that because the 2002 amendment was a substantive change
to the law, it could not be applied retroactively and the common law governed DMADC's
claim of forfeiture prior to 2002. (R. at 415-16, 736.) The district court found no basis
for partial forfeiture either before or after the 2002 amendment.
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water.6 Vincent uses every drop of water it can to irrigate cultivated acreage. At the time
the district court considered the competing motions herein, Vincent had approximately
897 acres of land prepared for full crop cultivation based upon the water deliveries from
the river and the expected future deliveries. Vincent was also prepared to irrigate an
additional 162 acres if the irrigation water was available.
Vincent was often required to irrigate its more marginal fields at less than a full
irrigation duty, growing pasture for fall and winter livestock grazing, to maximize the
benefit it received from the reduced water deliveries. In addition to its farming
operations, Vincent uses a portion of the ranch to graze cattle and for a commercial bird
hunting operation which requires denser vegetation than will grow with the natural
precipitation in the area. Vincent's irrigation of the natural vegetation was the only way
to maintain the denser habitat necessary for the cattle and for the birds raised in
connection with its hunting operation.
Although Vincent has usually been able to cultivate and irrigate less than 80% of
its land as a result of the reduced water deliveries, Vincent has been efficient in its use of
the water and has usually been able to irrigate a greater percentage of its land than the
amount of water made available to it would suggest. Vincent continued that effort to
maximize the beneficial use of its water right in 2006 by filing a change application with
6 The law does not require Vincent to spread the reduced amounts of water it receives
each year over all of its 1,051.5 permitted acres in order to prevent forfeiture, as DMADC
suggests. In a year where, for example, the river is anticipated to produce 60% of the
amount of water needed to satisfy the water rights, it makes sense for a farmer like
Vincent to plant and irrigate only 60% of its fields. It would be neither economical nor
beneficial in such a year for Vincent to be required to plant all of its permitted acreage,
knowing it would not then have sufficient water to bring any of its crops to maturity.
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the Utah State Engineer. Vincent sought to move the place of use of some of its water to
more profitable lands. In approving Vincent's application, the State Engineer stated that
"it appears that [Vincent] has consistently diverted the water available under this water
right and irrigated nearly all of the acreage." (R. at 226.)
DMADC argued that the facts concerning partial forfeiture were undisputed and
moved for summary judgment on the partial forfeiture claim. Based on the undisputed
reports submitted and relied upon by both parties (R. at 417-18), the district court found
that in 2007, Vincent used "all water made available to it, and had zero credit a[t] the end
of the year." (R. at 418.) Similarly, in 2002, Vincent used all but 9.6 acre feet made
available to it, which the court determined was less than 0.3% of the total water allocated
to Vincent—a de minimus amount. (R. at 418.) Vincent had beneficially used 100% of
the water available to it in 2007, and 99.7% of the water available in 2002. (R. at 418.)7
Accordingly, DMADC failed to, and cannot, establish any consecutive five year period
between 2002 and 2008 in which Vincent had received but failed to use a material
portion of its water right.
B.

DMADC's Other Post-2002 Arguments are Unavailing.

Having received an unfavorable decision, DMADC initiated a series of attempts to
reargue its position to the district court, based on facts already presented to and

7 These calculations were based on the incorrect 4 acre foot per acre duty advocated by
DMADC. (See R. at 685-66.)
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considered by the court. (See R. at 423-31, 569-78, 720-23.)* DMADC did not offer any
new evidence or legal theories (or even a valid excuse for its failure to advance timely
arguments), instead focusing on issues that were largely immaterial to the court's
decision. DMADC raises the same arguments on appeal, but they are still unavailing
because, according to section 73-1-4, Vincent's use of all the water provided by the
source exempts its right from forfeiture. DMADC recognizes the rules of statutory
construction (DMADC Br. at 8), but ignores the clear import of the exemption contained
in section 73-1-4. Moreover, the district court considered DMADC s additional
arguments, even though it was not required to do so, and came to the same result. (R. at
735-39,752-57.)
i.

Beneficial Use is Not Limited to Application of Water on
Cultivated Land.

DMADC claims, for example, that Vincent failed to cultivate more than 837 acres
and, consequently, could not have fully used the water right which allows for the
irrigation of 1,051.5 acres. DMADC also argues that Vincent's use of the tail water was
not a beneficial one and such water is therefore subject to forfeiture. DMADC implies
that irrigation necessarily means cultivation, as if the only permissible irrigation is for
cultivated crops.
Utah law does not limit the definition of beneficial use of an irrigation water right
to the application of water to cultivated acreage. This Court, for example, has upheld a

8 Although the district court considered and rejected DMADC s untimely arguments, its
decision is further supported by the fact that DMADC failed to provide any valid
justification to support its motions to supplement and for reconsideration.
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trial court's determination that irrigation water applied to natural vegetation which
"satisfied aesthetic desires, encouraged indigenous plants to proliferate, reduced fire
hazard, and created property line buffers" was a beneficial use of water sufficient to
overcome a claim of forfeiture. In re General Determination of the Rights to Use All of
Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and
Jordan River, 2004 UT 67, <H 36-37, 53-54, 98 P.3d 1. The Court noted that
"consideration of the ends to which the irrigation has been applied is particularly
relevant" and gave the example of cultivation of vegetation for grazing. Id., f 55, 98 P.3d
1. See also In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 355 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1960).
Here, Vincent's use of water to irrigate areas of natural vegetation goes well
beyond the beneficial use recognized by the Court to satisfy aesthetic desires, reduce fire
hazard, and create property line buffers. Vincent deliberately diverts water to specific
areas on its property to proliferate the growth of vegetation necessary for winter cattle
grazing and to support its commercial bird operation. To be clear, Vincent is not simply
growing natural vegetation or bird habitat to encourage the hunting of wild birds that may
or may not choose to nest on its land. Vincent runs a state-licensed bird hunting
operation. Vincent purchases eggs and/or young chicks and pen raises the animals for its
hunting operation. As hunters contract with Vincent for a bird hunting excursion, the
birds are planted in specific hunting areas.
A successful hunt requires dense vegetation where the birds can hide and where
dogs can be used to flush the birds. The vegetation naturally occurring on the dry range
land does not provide sufficient cover for the desired hunting experience. Hunters
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contract with Vincent—rather than hunt on the open range—in part because Vincent
provides better habitat areas. After the hunting season ends, Vincent puts its cattle into
the vegetated areas to graze reducing the need to purchase winter feed. These facts were
undisputed and, as the district court held, Vincent's use of water to support these ventures
clearly constitutes a beneficial use.
Contrary to DMADC's suggestion, Vincent's position on these matters did not
change. Vincent has consistently represented that it irrigates up 1,051.5 acres when it
can. Vincent can typically assume that it will be able to irrigate approximately 900 acres
each year to a full irrigation duty and has cultivated that acreage. It uses additional water,
to the extent it becomes available, to irrigate the remaining 150 acres allowed by the
water right. DMADC's continued claim that Vincent cultivated 837 acres and could not
have irrigated more is based on its unsupportable contention that irrigation water may
only be applied to cultivated acreage.
Moreover, DMADC's argument fails even if its acreage calculation were correct.
There was no dispute that Vincent used the water available to it in the relevant years to
irrigate at least 837 acres of cultivated land. It was also undisputed that the source failed
to supply sufficient water and that Vincent beneficially used the remainder to support its
bird hunting business and encourage growth of winter feed for its cattle. Regardless of
the number of cultivated acres Vincent was able to fully irrigate in any given year,
Vincent used the water made available to it.9 Additionally, the failure of the river to yield

9 It may not be coincidental that DMADC's calculation that Vincent irrigates 79.6% of
the land that is the basis for Vincent's water right (873/1,051.5) closely reflects the
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Vincent's full water right was dispositive. As a result, the district court was not required
to resolve DMADC's claimed dispute regarding the acreage cultivated by Vincent.
ii.

The District Court did not Shorten the Irrigation Season.

DMADC further claims that in making its determination the district court
mistakenly failed to consider the availability of pre-irrigation season water, and that the
division of the irrigation season is at odds with the Cox Decree. The Cox Decree,
however, clearly distinguishes between the two periods of water use {see R. at 13-14),
and DMADC's argument, though untimely, was considered by the district court. As
Vincent argued to the district court, DMADC's focus on water available between
March 1 and April 15 of each year was not based on new evidence. The district court
already had all of the evidence regarding the availability of irrigation water prior to
April 15 before it when it decided the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
The evidence showed that water available to Vincent prior to April 15 could be
diverted, assuming it could be put to beneficial use before the growing season, up to the
limit of Vincent's water right (22.0 cfs). However, there is no storage right associated
with this pre-irrigation season flow. If Vincent cannot beneficially use the water
available in March and early April that water is lost to it. Conversely, if Vincent is able
to divert and beneficially use pre-irrigation season water, its use is not deducted from
Vincent's right to divert water during the irrigation season by the river commissioner.

72.2% 30-year average yield of the Sevier River, as calculated based on records
maintained by the river commissioner. (R. at 206.) If anything, those figures indicate
that Vincent has been slightly more efficient in its farming operations than would be
anticipated based on its proportion of the river flows.
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Thus, as of April 16, Vincent's right remains the right to divert up to 22.0 cfs from the
Sevier River for the irrigation of 1,051.5 acres of land with 5,000 acre feet of water,
regardless of whether or not it was able to beneficially use water between March 1 and
April 15. Because the pre-irrigation season water cannot be stored or counted as a credit
for later delivery of water, Vincent cannot plan for the cultivation of its fields based upon
the availability of water from March 1 to April 15. Vincent must plan its land use and
crop cultivation based upon the water that it can reasonably expect to receive during the
growing season, typically after April 15.
Very few water users on the lower Sevier River can make beneficial use of preirrigation season water. There is generally little water available in the river because the
runoff season has not yet begun. And, in most years, the ditches cannot convey and
ground in the area cannot reasonably take irrigation water from March 1 to April 15
because the ditches are iced-over or the ground is still too wet from the winter
precipitation. Irrigating wet fields too early in the season can also damage crops.
DMADC's argument would require Vincent to run this early water to waste simply to
protect it from forfeiture, in contravention of DMADC's own cautions against wasting
water in this arid state.
The district court correctly observed that it did not need to address either party's
concerns about the early season water. (R. at 686.) Even considering "the combined
total of early water and water made available during the irrigation season," the water
supplied by the Sevier River was "insufficient to meet [Vincent's] annual allotment for at
least one out of each five year period between 1999 and 2008." (R. at 868.) The court's
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ruling was based on the undisputed evidence before it, including DMADC's records {see
R. at 686), and affidavits submitted by the Sevier River Commissioner on behalf of both
parties (see R. at 492-561, 587-90). Further, DMADC based its argument, as explained
below, on incorrect assumptions about the duty associated with Vincent's water right.
The district court did not disturb its original summary judgment ruling because Vincent's
water right was still exempt from forfeiture. (R. at 686-87.)
iii.

The Measure of Vincent's Water Right is 5,000 Acre Feet.

Finally, DMADC takes issue with the district court's holding that the "duty"
associated with Vincent's water right is 5,000 acre feet. DMADC asked the district court
to take judicial notice of a page of the Utah State Engineer's website, which lists the
generally duty for that geographical area as four acre feet of water per acre of land. (R. at
248.) DMADC makes this argument as if a "duty" figure administratively set by a state
agency somehow amends or limits the scope of a water right established and confirmed
by the district court in a general adjudication. Neither the legislature nor the courts have
accorded the Utah State Engineer the power to accomplish such a taking. Leaving aside
the district court's evidentiary concern about the State Engineer's own disclaimer about
the reliability of the information on its own website (R. at 685), the concept of "duty" is
nowhere defined or applied in the statutes governing Utah water rights. "Duty" may be a
useful administrative tool for the State Engineer to use in the discharge of his statutory
functions,10 but it is not a concept that administratively diminishes or limits rights

10 Counsel for Vincent acknowledged at argument that the State Engineer often
references a 4 acre foot per acre duty when it administratively evaluates water
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established by courts of competent jurisdiction, particularly when those courts issue
decrees at the conclusion of a laborious general adjudication process.
Vincent demonstrated that its predecessor-in-interest was awarded a water right
based on a flow of up to 22 cubic feet per second by the 1936 Cox Decree. That right, in
turn, had previously been quantified in the Proposed Determination as the right to receive
5,000 acre feet to complete the irrigation of 1,051.5 acres of land. (R. at 173-4, 365.) As
noted by DMADC itself in its opening brief, once any objections to a proposed
determination have been resolved, "'the district must enter judgment rendering the [PD]
the final adjudication of the water rights for the given area."' (DMADC Br. at 11
(quoting Green River Canal Co. v. Olds, 2004 UT 106,17,110 P.3d 666).) That
occurred in connection with the Cox Decree and the Decree, and the Proposed
Determination which it confirmed, were the final adjudication of the water right now
owned by Vincent. Significantly, DMADC did not appeal that decision, nor has it ever
attempted to reopen the general adjudication in order to amend the Cox Decree.
DMADC subsequently moved for reconsideration, and the district court
recognized that it had "failed to acknowledge the apparent issue of fact" related to the
"amount of acre feet of water [Vincent] is entitled to receive." (R. at 685.) Reevaluating
the parties' positions on the duty issue, the district court rejected DMADC s claim that
the Vincent water right had been diminished by an administratively established "duty" set

applications in Juab County but, contrary to the reference at page xx of DMADC s brief,
counsel did not concede that administrative duty applied to or limited Vincent's water
right as established by the Cox Decree. Indeed, Vincent contested DMADC s duty
argument. (R. at 356, 685-86.)
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forth on a website, especially since the website on which DMADC relied expressly states
that the information provided therein is "for general reference only and may not
accurately represent the correct duty value in certain locations." (R. at 685.) DMADC
provided no other support for its position.
By contrast, the Proposed Determination expressly allocates 5,000 acre feet to
Water Right No. 68-3002. (R. at 16.) That determination carries the force of law. In
order to address that figure in terms argued by DMADC, the district court equated it to a
duty of approximately 5 acre feet per acre (5,000 acre feet -r 1,051.5 acres). DMADC
objects to the district court's reliance on the Proposed Determination, saying that the
Proposed Determination may have proposed awarding Vincent's predecessor 5,000 acre
feet of water "but the Cox Decreed did not award this amount." (DMADC Br. at xx.)
This argument is nonsensical, especially in light of DMADC's later acknowledgements
that that the decree renders the Proposed Determination the final adjudication, and that a
"[f]ailure to protest a PD bars further challenge." (DMADC Br. at 11 (citing In re
General Determination of the Rights to Use All of Water, Both Surface and
Underground, Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and Jordan River, 2004 UT 67,
^22,98P.3dl).)
As noted, a proposed determination is prepared by the State Engineer for the court
to consider in ruling on a general adjudication. See, e.g., U.S. Fuel Co. v. HuntingtonCleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, f 14, 79 P.3d 945. A court "must render
judgment in accordance with a proposed determination where the proposed determination
is uncontested." Id. f 15, 79 P.3d 945. In issuing the Cox Decree, the court there noted
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its reliance on "the State Engineer of the State of Utah having made and filed herewith
his proposed determination of the rights in the use of the water of said Sevier River
System, as provided by the law." (R. at 166, 255.) The court, having "heard and
determined all objections filed to said proposed determination" (R. at 166, 255), entered
the Cox Decree and did not alter the number of acres or the amount of water associated
with Vincent's water right (see R. at 166-70, 255-60). Neither was subsequently
modified by the district court. (R. at 686.)
Both before the district court and on appeal, DMADC relied on the Proposed
Determination in advancing other arguments. It now claims, however, that reliance by
the district court on that same document for the measure of the Vincent water rights is
improper. There is no factual or legal basis for DMADC s position. The district court
properly relied on the Proposed Determination and Cox Decree, which was the
uncontro verted evidence before the court and showed that the amount of water awarded
to Vincent's predecessor-in-interest was 5,000 acre feet for use on 1,051.5 acres, or an
approximate "duty," in DMADC s vernacular, of about 5 acre feet per acre.
II.

UTAH LAW DID NOT PROVIDE FOR PARTIAL FORFEITURE PRIOR
TO 2002
DMADC also argues that the district court erred by failing to consider the alleged

nonuse of water by Vincent's predecessor, Mclntyre, and by failing to apply "the
forfeiture test established by this Court" in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Rents Lake
Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108 (Utah 1943). (DMADC Br. at xi-xii.) DMADC claims that
in deciding Rocky Ford, the Court expressly adopted partial forfeiture as a part of Utah
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law, and that the Court's discussion of partial forfeiture "is not dicta." (DMADC Br. at
7.) In making this argument, DMADC either misreads or ignores the caselaw.

A.

Partial Forfeiture Was Not the Law in Utah until it was Enacted by the
Legislature in 2002.

The district court accommodated DMADC s request on reconsideration,
reexamined the record, and expressly found that there was not sufficient water in the
Sevier River in the years prior to 2002 to satisfy the Vincent water right, concluding that
the water right would therefore not have been susceptible to forfeiture if Utah had
recognized partial forfeiture during that period. (R. at 735, 738.) DMADC correctly
recognizes that this was an alternative holding. The district court's primary holding was
that the 2002 amendment to section 73-1-4 established for the first time in Utah law the
possibility that a portion of a water right could be forfeited. (The common understanding
before that time was that the use of any portion of a water right preserved the whole.)
The district court determined that the 2002 amendment was substantive and thus could
not be applied to periods before its enactment because the legislature gave no indication
that the amendment was intended to have retroactive effect. (R. at 416.) See Olsen v.
Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998). It was the creation of new,
substantive law that cannot apply to periods prior to 2002. See Harvey v. Cedar Hills
City, 2010 UT 12, ffl 12-13, 227 P.3d 256.
DMADC claims instead that Rocky Ford established partial forfeiture prior to the
statute's 2002 amendment. In Rocky Ford, the plaintiff opposed a change application
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filed by the defendant, contending that the defendant forfeited a portion of its water right
by failing to use it over a five year period. Id, at 111. The State Engineer and lower
court both approved the defendant's change application. Id, at 110. On appeal, this
Court held that the defendant's water right was not subject to forfeiture because it had
made use of all of the water available to it in one out of the five years of nonuse claimed
by the plaintiff. Id, at 113. Evaluating the parties' competing evidence, the Court stated
"if there were a five year continuous period during which [the defendant] failed to use
material amounts of available water, we should hold that a forfeiture of at least part of its
right has occurred by virtue of this nonuse." Id. at 112. The Court determined that it did
not need to decide that question, however, because the defendant's use of all water
available to it in the relevant time period precluded forfeiture. Id, at 112-13. The Court's
statement that it "should" make a particular holding was expressly conditional, and could
be read to depend in a variety of ways, including the supposition that partial forfeiture
ought to be the law in Utah but was not. The Court's supposition about partial forfeiture
was clearly not the holding of the case, and it neither established nor confirmed partial
forfeiture as a feature of Utah law.
Vincent's reading of Rocky Ford is consistent with this Court's subsequent
observation that the question of partial forfeiture "has never been directly before this
Court." Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 774 n.9 (Utah 1991). Expressly citing
Rocky Ford (the case DMADC claims had settled the issue), the Court stated:
The question of partial forfeiture is not addressed in our statutes and has
never been directly before this court . . . . A 1943 case did, however,
intimate—without squarely deciding—that partial forfeiture is possible.
33

See Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Rents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202, 135
P.2d 108, 112(1943).
Id. (emphasis added). Contrary to DMADC's argument, the language regarding partial
forfeiture in Rocky Ford was not a holding but rather an acknowledgement by the court
of an argument it did not need to reach. In 2004, the Court repeated that it has "never
expressly adopted the principle of partial forfeiture of water rights." In re General
Determination of the Rights to Use All of Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within
the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and Jordan River, 2004 UT 67, <j[ 56 n.7, 98 P.3d 1
(emphasis added).
Perhaps because these cases undermine DMADC's argument, DMADC fails to
cite them. Vincent suggests it is significant (though certainly not controlling) that the
Eskelsen Court noted without criticism the trial court's holding that partial forfeiture does
not apply in the state of Utah. Eskelsen, 819 P.2d at 774 n.9. The Court did not need to
reach that issue in Eskelsen because, as here, the facts did not support partial forfeiture.
Id.
Although partial forfeiture was not then a part of Utah law, the Court in Eskelsen
recognized that policy considerations might support enactment of partial forfeiture and,
essentially, invited the Utah Legislature to review the issue. Discussing the trial court's
holding that partial forfeiture does not apply in the state of Utah, the Court continued
Such a result would mean that the use of any part of a water right, no matter
how small, would preserve the whole. As a matter of public policy, it
might be prudent to allow partial forfeiture; all of the policy reasons that
support forfeiture as a general principle would be furthered by, and
hindered without, partial forfeiture.

34

Id. (emphasis added). In 2002, the Utah Legislature accepted the Court's invitation and,
based at least in part on the policy considerations identified, enacted the partial forfeiture
provision. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (2002). Nothing in the statute indicates, and no
party has argued, that this amendment was intended to have retroactive effect.
Because there was no statute or reported decision in this arid state expressly
providing for partial forfeiture in the more than 150 years before the 2002 enactment,
DMADC and the State Engineer are forced to argue that such a doctrine was inherently
or impliedly part of the law. DMADC suggests that a plain reading of Utah Code
Annotated section 73-1-3 is all that is required to reverse, though no court had ever
reached that conclusion. DMADC and the State Engineer focus largely on beneficial use,
which Vincent freely acknowledges is the basis, measure, and limit of a water right. But
that general principle of water law does not trump the specific facts of this case. Their
arguments ignore the fact that Vincent owns a water right the parameters of which were
established by judicial decree issued following a general adjudication, a decree that has
never been limited or amended by the court. Their arguments ignore the undisputed fact
that the Sevier River has delivered the full amount of decreed water only three times in
the past thirty years and, particularly, ignore the fact that Vincent has consistently put to
beneficial use substantially all of the water made available to it.
The State Engineer claims that without partial forfeiture, a water user could
preserve a water right in its entirety by using only 2% of the right for 100 years. (State
Engineer Br. at 8.) But those numbers do not even approach the facts of this case.
Indeed, the State Engineer acknowledges in one sentence of its brief, but without further
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comment, the basis for the district court's holding here, "[t]his Court has held that
forfeiture does not occur when nature does not provide sufficient water for use under the
water right." (State Engineer Br. at 14 (citing Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Rents Lake
Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 113 (Utah 1943)).) The State Engineer is also afraid that a
water user who ceases to use its full water right could resume full use in the future and
somehow reap a windfall. (State Engineer Br. at 11.) This imagined evil is not remotely
present here. The State Engineer's arguments appear to be based on DMADC's
unsupported argument that Vincent did not use substantial portions of its water right.
The undisputed facts before the court demonstrated otherwise.
The State Engineer frankly does not appear to understand that he has no role in
forfeiture matters, even though this Court has on occasion felt constrained to remind him
of that fact. Forfeiture is always, and exclusively, a function for the judiciary. See
Jensen v. Jones, 2011 UT 67, fR 10-13, 270 P.3d 425. The State Engineer lacks any
authority to adjudicate water rights, including forfeiture issues. Id., 270 P.3d 425. The
State Engineer, an executive officer, is incorrect when he argues that partial forfeiture
powers are granted to him under the general adjudication statute, and that he needs to
determine partial forfeiture in order to evaluate water use and issue proposed
determinations. (State Engineer Br. at 14-17.)
The State Engineer is charged by the general adjudication statute with the
responsibility of assisting the court by investigating and mapping diversion points,
conveyance systems, and places of use for each water right. In that process and in
completing a proposed determination, the State Engineer is clearly required to consider
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the extent to which water rights are then being put to beneficial use. Beneficial use is the
basic measure of all water rights adjudicated by the courts, but the State Engineer's role
in that process is to complete a "survey" of the use of the water rights in the drainage,
provide notice and an opportunity for comment, and then formulate a report and proposed
determination for the court. Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-3 through 73-4-11 (2012). This is
an important responsibility for which the State Engineer is well qualified. He acts like a
statutorily appointed special master to assist the court: he completes his administrative
functions as described by statute, and then publishes and files a proposed determination.
Contrary to the arguments of DMADC and the State Engineer, it is the court that
makes judicial determinations regarding the priority and use of water. See U.S. Fuel Co.
v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, f 14, 79 P.3d 945. In making a
proposed determination, the State Engineer is not ruling on forfeiture of water rights.
Rather, the State Engineer investigates and reports on the current beneficial use of the
various claimants. See id., 79 P.3d 945. The State Engineer has no power to strip a water
right from its owner, either fully or partially. See id., 79 P.3d 945. Courts alone have the
power to determine water rights and "are under no obligation to defer to" the State
Engineer's findings. See id., 79 P.3d945.
Vincent's water right stands until a court determines otherwise. It was established
in the Cox Decree. The general adjudication statutes provide that, once the right to use of
water "has been decreed or adjudicated" by the court, the State Engineer "shall
distribute" water "in accordance with the decree until the decree is reversed, modified,
vacated, or otherwise legally set aside." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11(3) (2012). The Cox
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Decree, as DMADC admits, has not been reversed or altered. (DMADC Br. at 20.) The
role of the State Engineer with regard to this, and other, decreed rights, is to distribute
water according to the decree. The doctrine of partial forfeiture is neither an express nor
an ancillary part of that function.
DMADC describes a condition for Vincent that applies throughout the Sevier
River drainage; i.e., there is less water available than was originally decreed. DMADC
and a host of others are affected by that chronic situation in the same way as is Vincent.
Should DMADC desire a redistribution of the lifeblood of this part of the desert,
DMADC's remedy is not to try to strip increments of water from individual farms that
are equally affected by the shortages. See In re General Determination of Rights to the
Use of Water, 2004 UT 106, 1j 5, 110 P.3d 666 (observing that the purpose of a general
adjudication process is to prevent piecemeal litigation). (See also DMADC Br. at 11 n.20
(recognizing that the proper procedure is a general adjudication to avoid piecemeal
litigation).) DMADC's remedy is instead to petition the courts to re-adjudicate the river.
The State Engineer would then be empowered to investigate the current, actual beneficial
use of all of the waters currently being diverted from the Sevier River and make its
recommendation to a court. The court may then replace or amend the Cox Decree in a
manner that is equitable to those who depend on the waters of the Sevier River for their
livelihood. In the meantime, the Cox Decree, and the Proposed Determination on which
it was based, remain the law of the land.
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B,

Mclntyre Did Not Receive Its Full Water Right and Used All Water
Available to It*

Even if the partial forfeiture amendment found in Utah Code Annotated section
73-1-4 had application to periods prior to 2002, DMADC's claim fails because Vincent
and its predecessor used all of the water available to them. Vincent, as discussed, used
substantially all of the water available to it between 1998 when it acquired the property
and 2002. Any material nonuse of Water Right No. 68-3002 by Vincent was due solely
to the failure of the Sevier River to provide the full allocation of the water right. The
records of the Sevier River Commissioner show that Mclntyre similarly did not receive
its full allocation of water under Water Right 68-3002. See Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v.
Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 111 (Utah 1943) ("[T]he courts have uniformly
held that forfeiture will not operate in those cases where the failure to use is the result of
physical causes beyond the control of the appropriator such as . . . draughts, etc., where
the appropriator is ready and willing to diver the water when it is naturally available.").
The only year relevant to this claim in which Mclntyre may have received the full
5000 acre-foot allocation was 1988. (R. at 206.) Each and every year thereafter, up until
the date Vincent purchased the ranch in 1998, Mclntyre did not receive its full allocation
of water in any subsequent year. In most years, the water made available to Mclntyre
was more than 600 acre-feet short of the allocation and in some years it was more than
1,000 acre-feet short of the decreed right. (See R. at 206, 366, 368-82.) Even so,
DMADC's own declarant testified that Mclntyre used all of the water it could and that
they never received more water than could be used on the cultivated acres. (R. at 344.)
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The evidence similarly established that Vincent, prior to 2002, used all of the water made
available to it by the Sevier River.
III.

DMADC's ABANDOMENT CLAIM WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED
DMADC's remaining argument is that the district court improperly dismissed its

abandonment claim. DMADC sought declarations of both forfeiture and abandonment of
Vincent's water right pursuant to section 73-1-4. (R. at 7.) DMADC, in effect, invited
the district court to evaluate its claim for abandonment under the same statutory scheme
that applies to forfeiture. (R. at 7, 736-37.) The court did so and because DMADC failed
to establish the necessary factors for forfeiture under that statute, the district court
correctly dismissed the abandonment claim premised on the same statute.
As DMADC explains, abandonment requires proof of the water user's intent to
abandon the water right. (DMADC Br. at 26.) Vincent asked for summary judgment on
the abandonment claim because it was based on the same facts DMADC offered to
support its forfeiture claim. In response, DMADC presented no evidence of Vincent's
supposed intent to abandon its water right. While intent of abandonment may be implied
in some circumstances (see DMADC Br. at 26), intent could not be implied here because
DMADC failed to show that Vincent did not use the water made available to it.11

11 DMADC's complaint that the district court failed to rule on its abandonment claim is
also undermined by DMADC's approval of the May 7, 2012 Final Order and Judgment.
By approving the form of the judgment, DMADC confirmed "the parties' agreement, as
evidenced by their approval of this Order, that there are no issues remaining for trial and
thus no reason to delay entry of a final judgment herein." (R. at 753.)
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Vincent should be affirmed in each of its particulars.
Dated this 9th day of January 2013.
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U.C.A. 1953 §73-1-4
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 73. WATER AND IRRIGATION
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Copyright (c) 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session
73-1-4 Reversion to the public by abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse within five years —Extension of time.
(1) In order to further the state policy of securing the maximum use and benefit of its scarce water resources, a
person entitled to the use of water has a continuing obligation to place all of a water right to beneficial use. The forfeiture of all or part of any right to use water for failure to place all or part of the water to beneficial use makes possible
the allocation and use of water consistent with long established beneficial use concepts. The provisions of Subsections
(2) through (6) shall be construed to carry out the purposes and policies set forth in this Subsection (1).
(2) As used in this section, "public water supply entity" means an entity that supplies water as a utility service or for
irrigation purposes and is also:
(a) a municipality, water conservancy district, metropolitan water district, irrigation district created under Section
17A-2-7, or other public agency;
(b) a water company regulated by the Public Service Commission; or
(c) any other owner of a community water system.
(3) (a) When an appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest abandons or ceases to use all or a portion of a
water right for a period of five years, the water right or the unused portion of that water right ceases and the water
reverts to the public, unless, before the expiration of the five-year period, the appropriator or the appropriator's
successor in interest files a verified nonuse application with the state engineer.
(b) (i) A nonuse application may be filed on all or a portion of the water right, including water rights held by mutual
irrigation companies,
(ii) Public water supply entities that own stock in a mutual water company, after giving written notice to the water
company, may file nonuse applications with the state engineer on the water represented by the stock.
(c) (i) A water right or a portion of the water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial action to declare the right
forfeited is commenced within 15 years from the end of the latest period of nonuse of at least five years,
(ii) If forfeiture is asserted in an action for general determination of rights in conformance with the provisions of
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, the 15-year limitation period shall commence to run back in time from
the date the state engineer's proposed determination of rights is served upon each claimant,
(iii) A decree entered in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights,
shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right determined to be valid in the decree, but shall
not bar a claim for periods of nonuse that occur after the entry of the decree,
(iv) A proposed determination by the state engineer in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4,
Determination of Water Rights, shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right proposed to be
valid, unless a timely objection has been filed within the time allowed in Chapter 4, Determination of Water
Rights.
(d) The extension of time to resume the use of that water may not exceed five years unless the time is further extended
by the state engineer.
(e) The provisions of this section are applicable whether the unused or abandoned water or a portion of the water is
permitted to run to waste or is used by others without right with the knowledge of the water right holder, provided
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that the use of water pursuant to a lease or other agreement with the appropriator or the appropriated successor shall
be considered to constitute beneficial use.
(f) The provisions of this section shall not apply:
(i) to those periods of time when a surface water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right, or when
groundwater is not available because of a sustained drought;
(ii) to water stored in reservoirs pursuant to an existing water right, where the stored water is being held in storage for
present or future use; or
(iii) when a water user has beneficially used substantially all of a water right within afive-yearperiod, provided that
this exemption shall not apply to the adjudication of a water right in a general determination of water rights under
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights.
(g) Groundwater rights used to supplement the quantity or quality of other water supplies may not be subject to loss or
reduction under this section if not used during periods when the other water source delivers sufficient water so as to
not require use of the supplemental groundwater.
(4) (a) The state engineer shall furnish an application requiring the following information:
(i) the name and address of the applicant;
(ii) a description of the water right or a portion of the water right, including the point of diversion, place of use, and
priority;
(iii) the date the water was last diverted and placed to beneficial use;
(iv) the quantity of water;
(v) the period of use;
(vi) the extension of time applied for;
(vii) a statement of the reason for the nonuse of the water; and
(viii) any other information that the state engineer requires.
(b) Filing the application extends the time during which nonuse may continue until the state engineer issues his order
on the nonuse application,
(c) (i) Upon receipt of the application, the state engineer shall publish, once a week for two successive weeks, a notice of
the application in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the source of the water supply is
located and where the water is to be used,
(ii) The notice shall inform the public of the nature of the right for which the extension is requested and the reasons for
the extension.
(d) Any interested person may file a written protest with the state engineer against the granting of the application:
(i) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is informal; and
(ii) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is formal.
(e) In any proceedings to determine whether the application for extension should be approved or rejected, the state
engineer shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(f) After further investigation, the state engineer may approve or reject the application.
(5) (a) Nonuse applications on all or a portion of a water right shall be granted by the state engineer for periods not
exceedingfiveyears each, upon a showing of reasonable cause for nonuse.
(b) Reasonable causes for nonuse include:
(i) demonstrable financial hardship or economic depression;
(ii) the initiation of recognized water conservation or efficiency practices, or the operation of a groundwater recharge
recovery program approved by the state engineer;
(iii) operation of legal proceedings;
(iv) the holding of a water right or stock in a mutual water company without use by any public water supply entity to
meet the reasonable future requirements of the public;
(v) situations where, in the opinion of the state engineer, the nonuse would assist in implementing an existing, approved water management plan;
(vi) situations where all or part of the land on which water is used is contracted under an approved state agreement or
federal conservation fallowing program;
(vii) the loss of capacity caused by deterioration of the water supply or delivery equipment if the applicant submits,
with the application, a specific plan to resume full use of the water right by replacing, restoring, or improving the
equipment; or
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(viii) any other reasonable cause.
(6) (a) Sixty days before the expiration of any extension of time, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by registered
mail or by any form of electronic communication through which receipt is verifiable, of the date when the extension
period will expire.
(b) Before the date of expiration, the applicant shall either:
(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer setting forth the date on which use of the water was resumed, and
whatever additional information is required by the state engineer; or
(ii) apply for a further extension of time in which to resume use of the water according to the procedures and requirements of this section.
(c) Upon receipt of the applicant's properly completed, verified statement, the state engineer shall conduct investigations necessary to verify that beneficial use has resumed and, if so, shall issue a certificate of resumption of use of
the water as evidenced by the resumed beneficial use.
(7) The appropriator's water right or a portion of the water right ceases and the water reverts to the public if the:
(a) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for an extension of time;
(b) state engineer denies the nonuse application; or
(c) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for a further extension of time.
History: L. 1919, ch. 67, § 6;R.S. 1933, 100-1-4;L. 1935,ch. 104, § 1; 1939, ch. I l l , § 1;C. 1943, 100-1-4; L. 1945,
ch. 134, § 1; 1959, ch. 137, § 1; 1987, ch. 161, § 287; 1988, ch. 72, § 28; 1995, ch. 19, § 1; 1996, ch. 98, § 1; 2001, ch.
136, § l;2002,ch.20, § 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. —The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, redesignated the second sentence of Subsection (l)(b) as (l)(c); subdivided Subsection (2)(c); substituted "two" for "three" before "successive weeks" and added
"and where water is to be used" in Subsection (2)(c)(i); added Subsections (2)(c)(ii), (2)(d)(i), and (2)(d)(ii); and made
related and stylistic changes throughout.
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, in Subsection (l)(a), substituted "water right ceases and the water
reverts to the public" for "the right ceases"; added Subsection (l)(b), and redesignated subsequent subsections accordingly; redesignated former Subsection (5) as Subsection (4) and former Subsection (4) as Subsection (5); added
Subsection (5)(a)(iii); and made stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection (4)(a) added "or by any form of electronic communication through which receipt is verifiable," in Subsection (4)(b)(i) added "in a manner prescribed by the state engineer," and made stylistic changes.
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, rewrote this section.
Compiler's Notes. —This section was Comp. Laws 1907, § 1288x23.
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-1-4
UT ST §73-1-4
END OF DOCUMENT
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U.C.A. 1953 §73-1-4
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 73. Water and Irrigation
Chapter 1. General Provisions
§ 73-1-4. Reversion to the publie by abandonment or forfeiture for nonuse within five years—Extension of
time
(l)(a) In order to further the state policy of securing the maximum use and benefit of its scarce water resources, a
person entitled to the use of water has a continuing obligation to place all of a water right to beneficial use.
(b) The forfeiture of all or part of any right to use water for failure to place all or part of the water to beneficial use
makes possible the allocation and use of water consistent with long established beneficial use concepts.
(c) The provisions of Subsections (2) through (6) shall be construed to carry out the purposes and policies set forth in
this Subsection (1).
(2) As used in this section, "public water supply entity" means an entity that supplies water as a utility service or for
irrigation purposes and is also:
(a) a municipality, water conservancy district, metropolitan water district, irrigation district, or other public agency;
(b) a water company regulated by the Public Service Commission; or
(c) any other owner of a community water system.
(3)(a) When an appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest abandons or ceases to use all or a portion of a
water right for a period of five years, the water right or the unused portion of that water right ceases and the water
reverts to the public, unless, before the expiration of the five-year period, the appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest files a verified nonuse application with the state engineer.
(b)(i) A nonuse application may be filed on all or a portion of the water right, including water rights held by mutual
irrigation companies,
(ii) Public water supply entities that own stock in a mutual water company, after giving written notice to the water
company, may file nonuse applications with the state engineer on the water represented by the stock.
(c)(i) A water right or a portion of the water right may not be forfeited unless a judicial action to declare the right
forfeited is commenced within 15 years from the end of the latest period of nonuse of at least five years,
(ii) If forfeiture is asserted in an action for general determination of rights in conformance with the provisions of
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights, the 15-year limitation period shall commence to run back in time from
the date the state engineer's proposed determination of rights is served upon each claimant,
(iii) A decree entered in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4, Determination of Water
Rights, shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right determined to be valid in the decree, but
shall not bar a claim for periods of nonuse that occur after the entry of the decree.
(iv) A proposed determination by the state engineer in an action for general determination of rights under Chapter 4,
Determination of Water Rights, shall bar any claim of forfeiture for prior nonuse against any right proposed to be
valid, unless a timely objection has been filed within the time allowed in Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights.
(d) The extension of time to resume the use of that water may not exceed five years unless the time is further extended
by the state engineer.
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(e) The provisions of this section are applicable whether the unused or abandoned water or a portion of the water is
permitted to run to waste or is used by others without right with the knowledge of the water right holder, provided that
the use of water pursuant to a lease or other agreement with the appropriator or the appropriator's successor shall be
considered to constitute beneficial use.
(f) The provisions of this section shall not apply:
(i) to those periods of time when a surface water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy the water right, or
when groundwater is not available because of a sustained drought;
(ii) to water stored in reservoirs pursuant to an existing water right, where the stored water is being held in storage
for present or future use; or
(iii) when a water user has beneficially used substantially all of a water right within a five-year period, provided that
this exemption shall not apply to the adjudication of a water right in a general determination of water rights under
Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights.
(g) Groundwater rights used to supplement the quantity or quality of other water supplies may not be subject to loss or
reduction under this section if not used during periods when the other water source delivers sufficient water so as to
not require use of the supplemental groundwater.
(4)(a) The state engineer shall furnish an application requiring the following information:
(i) the name and address of the applicant;
(ii) a description of the water right or a portion of the water right, including the point of diversion, place of use, and
priority;
(iii) the date the water was last diverted and placed to beneficial use;
(iv) the quantity of water;
(v) the period of use;
(vi) the extension of time applied for;
(vii) a statement of the reason for the nonuse of the water; and
(viii) any other information that the state engineer requires,
(b) Filing the application extends the time during which nonuse may continue until the state engineer issues his order
on the nonuse application.
(c)(i) Upon receipt of the application, the state engineer shall publish a notice of the application once a week for two
successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the source of the water supply is located
and where the water is to be used.
(ii) The notice shall:
(A) state that an application has been made; and
(B) specify where the interested party may obtain additional information relating to the application.
(d) Any interested person may file a written protest with the state engineer against the granting of the application:
(i) within 20 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is informal; and
(ii) within 30 days after the notice is published, if the adjudicative proceeding is formal.
(e) In any proceedings to determine whether the application for extension should be approved or rejected, the state
engineer shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(f) After further investigation, the state engineer may approve or reject the application.
(5)(a) Nonuse applications on all or a portion of a water right shall be granted by the state engineer for periods not
exceeding five years each, upon a showing of reasonable cause for nonuse.
(b) Reasonable causes for nonuse include:
(i) demonstrable financial hardship or economic depression;
(ii) the initiation of recognized water conservation or efficiency practices, or the operation of a groundwater recharge recovery program approved by the state engineer;
(iii) operation of legal proceedings;
(iv) the holding of a water right or stock in a mutual water company without use by any public water supply entity to
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meet the reasonable future requirements of the public;
(v) situations where, in the opinion of the state engineer, the nonuse would assist in implementing an existing, approved water management plan;
(vi) situations where all or part of the land on which water is used is contracted under an approved state agreement or
federal conservation fallowing program;
(vii) the loss of capacity caused by deterioration of the water supply or delivery equipment if the applicant submits,
with the application, a specific plan to resume full use of the water right by replacing, restoring, or improving the
equipment; or
(viii) any other reasonable cause.
(6)(a) Sixty days before the expiration of any extension of time, the state engineer shall notify the applicant by mail or
by any form of electronic communication through which receipt is verifiable, of the date when the extension period
will expire.
(b) Before the date of expiration, the applicant shall either:
(i) file a verified statement with the state engineer setting forth the date on which use of the water was resumed, and
whatever additional information is required by the state engineer; or
(ii) apply for a further extension of time in which to resume use of the water according to the procedures and requirements of this section.
(c) Upon receipt of the applicant's properly completed, verified statement, the state engineer shall conduct investigations necessary to verify that beneficial use has resumed and, if so, shall issue a certificate of resumption of use of the
water as evidenced by the resumed beneficial use.
(7) The appropriator's water right or a portion of the water right ceases and the water reverts to the public if the:
(a) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for an extension of time;
(b) state engineer denies the nonuse application; or
(c) appropriator or the appropriator's successor in interest fails to apply for a further extension of time.
Laws 1919, c. 67, § 6; Laws 1935, c. 104, § 1; Laws 1939, c. 111, § 1; Laws 1945, c. 134, § 1; Laws 1959, c. 137, § 1;
Laws 1987, c. 161, § 287; Laws 1988, c. 72. § 28: Laws 1995. c. 19. § 1. eff May 1, 1995: Laws 1996. c. 98. § 1. eff
April 29. 1996: Laws 2001. c. 136. § 1. eff. April 30.2001: Laws 2002, c. 20, $ 1, eff May 6,2002: Laws 2003. c. 99.
§ 1. eff. May 5. 2003: Laws 2007. c. 136. § 37. eff April 30. 2007: Laws 2007. c. 329. § 460. eff April 30. 2007.
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 100-1-4; C. 1943, § 100-1-4.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of Laws 2007. c. 136, § 37 and Laws
2007, c. 329. § 460.
U.C.A. 1953 § 73-1-4, UT ST § 73-1-4
Current through 2007 General Legislative Session.
Copr (c) 2007 Thomson/West
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>RIMARYAVE.
Category:
WATER
PRIMARY AVE.
1935—46.3%
1936—50.7%
1937—65.3%
1938—65.3%
1939—56.1%
5 year ave.=56.7%
1940—59.7%
1941—72.8%
1942—84.4%
1943—67.1%
1944—84.6%
1945—85.6%
1946—73.5%
1947—79.0%
1948—84.1%***
1949—76.0%
10yearave.=76.7%
1950—59.9%
1951—57.0%
1952—84.9%
1953—69.9%
1954—56.0%
1955—51.6%
1956—40.5%
1957—61.4%
1958—71.6%
1959—46.7%
10yearave.=60.0%
1960—43.7%
1961—
1962—60.4%
1963—41.1%
1964—45.1%
1965—63.3%
1966—50.1%
1967—46.7%
1968—65.6%
1969—85.1%
9yearave.=55.7%
1970—83%
1971—74%
1972—53%
1973—82.4%
1974—77%
1975—79%
1976—61%
1977—42.1%
1978—56%
1979—70.1%
10yearave.=67.8%
1980—87%
1981—77.9%
1982—87.1%
1983—100%
1984—100%
1985—96%
orvrr a-in AIM

ACI

1986—100%
1987—80.3%
1988—84%
1989—69.9%
10yearave.=88.2%
1990—58.7%
1991—62.1%
1992—54.3%
1993—68.6%
1994—55.0%
1995—79.7%
1996—69.6%
1997—82.9%
1998—87.5%
1999—83.7%
10yearave.=70.2%
2000—64.4%
2001—62.7%
2002—49.2%
2003—50.1%
2004—51.2%
2005—68.7%
2006—67.6%
7yearave.=59.10%
1935-1939 ave.=56.7%
1940-1949 ave.=76.7%
1950-1959 ave =60.0%
1960-1969 ave.=55.7%
1970-1979 ave =67.76%
1980-1989 ave =88.2%
1990-1999 ave.=70.2%
30 year ave.=72.20%(1977-2006)
71 year ave. =67.98%(1935-2006)-1961 no record

